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COOPER SUPREMACY
Rebecca E. Zietlow*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cooper v. Aaron,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
articulated a doctrine of judicial supremacy to justify the role of federal
courts as protectors of the rights of minorities.2 In Cooper, the Court
reaffirmed its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education3 that state laws
mandating racial segregation in public schools violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Cooper responded to State of
Arkansas officials who had rejected that mandate and flouted the Court’s
influence. Prior to Brown and Cooper, progressives had been wary of the
Court’s approach to individual rights. During the early part of the nineteenth
century, the Court had primarily used its power to strike down laws that
progressives supported. In Cooper, the Court asserted two propositions that
were essential to protecting civil rights: that the Court was committed to
protecting those rights, and that it would assert all of its power to do so.5
In the ensuing decade, the Warren Court issued numerous rulings
expanding minority rights,6 increasing access to the federal courts for civil
rights plaintiffs,7 and upholding the constitutionality of federal civil rights
statutes.8 As a result, liberals embraced the doctrine of judicial supremacy
and the view that the federal courts were the primary protectors of minority
rights. Liberals’ embrace of judicial supremacy in the 1960s stood in sharp
contrast to the attitudes towards the Court held by progressives since the
Reconstruction Eraviewing the Court as a threat to individual rights, not a

*

Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law.
Thanks so much to Shelby Howlett, Allison Tschiemer, and all of the editors of the
University of Arkansas Little Rock Law Review, to Dean Theresa Beiner for inviting me to
participate in this symposium, and to all of the other participants in this symposium. It was
truly a pleasure to be in this symposium, and to learn from the other participants.
1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
2. Id. at 18.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17.
5. Id.
6. See infra Section IV.A.
7. See infra Section IV.A.1.
8. See infra Section IV.A.2.
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champion of those rights.9 By contrast, progressives viewed the Warren
Court as a champion of minority rights.10 However, in recent years, the
Court has reverted to its previous role, using its supreme power to strike
down laws that protect minority rights.11 Indeed, with the Court’s new
entrenched conservative majority, Cooper supremacy presents a threat to the
rights of minorities with few limits on the Court’s power.
Cooper supremacy is marked by two themes. First, the Court is the
supreme expositor of constitutional law. Second, the Court uses that power
to enforce the civil rights of minorities. In Cooper, the Warren Court
provided an answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty posed by the
unelected judiciary overturning acts of the politically elected branches.12 The
Warren Court used Cooper supremacy to protect the rights of minorities
against the tyranny of the majority.13 Following Cooper, Warren Court
rulings enforcing the civil rights of minorities appeared to vindicate liberal
support of expansive Supreme Court power. The Warren Court expanded
access to federal courts by civil rights plaintiffs and broadly enforced those
rights. Using Cooper supremacy, members of the Court acted as “countermajoritarian heroes,” protecting the rights of minorities and opening the
federal courts as sites of redress for minority plaintiffs seeking to vindicate
their rights.14 At the same time, the Warren Court deferred to the acts of the
coordinate federal branches as they also enforced the civil rights of
minorities.15
Since the Warren Court, Cooper supremacy has governed the Court’s
exercise of judicial review. Unfortunately, the Court no longer relies on that
supremacy to protect minority rights. Instead, the Court has backed away
from protecting the rights of minorities, restricting the federal courts’
authority to protect civil rights and narrowing the meaning of those rights.
First the Burger Court and then the Rehnquist Court invoked federalism and

9. See LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES
COMPROMISE 53 (2016) (discussing the National Civil Liberties Board’s, a successor to the
American Civil Liberties Union, reluctance to resort to the federal courts during the postLochner era); REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 69–71 (2006) (discussing the progressive’s
campaign to limit federal jurisdiction).
10. See infra Section IV.A.2.
11. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
12. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
13. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980).
14. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions,
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
15. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (And Why It
Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L. J. 255, 274–87 (2008).
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separation of powers to limit access to courts for civil rights litigants,16 and
adopted substantive doctrines that made it harder for those litigants to
prevail on their claims.17 Today, the Roberts Court, rather than invoking
judicial supremacy to protect civil rights against infringement by the
majority, has invoked it to restrict the ability of the political branches to do
so.18 What remains of the Cooper legacy is pure judicial supremacy without
its counter-majoritarian justification. Regardless of the Court’s good
intentions in Cooper, Cooper supremacy is a cautionary example of the
dangers of one branch of government assuming too much power.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITY RIGHTS
Prior to the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education,19 the Supreme
Court of the United States provided little protection for racial minorities. In
its early cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court largely
rejected the claims of freed slaves and their descendants to protection under
that Amendment.20 For example, in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson,21
the Court upheld a Louisiana law which required railroad cars to be
segregated on the basis of race.22 The Court held that state laws that required
“separate but equal” accommodations for people of different races did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 A few
years later, the Court upheld a Kentucky state law which prohibited
universities from providing desegregated education to blacks and whites.24
Clearly, the federal courts provided scant recourse for African Americans
seeking racial justice.
During the early twentieth century, progressives advocated for the
doctrine of judicial deference and decried judicial activism, which they

16. See infra Section IV.B.1.
17. See infra Section IV.B.2.
18. See infra Section IV.C.
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. The Court struck down a West Virginia law excluding blacks from jury service in
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). However, the Court rejected the civil rights
claims of blacks who had been injured in the Colfax massacre, a race riot in Louisiana,
holding that congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend to
addressing private action in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The Court
reaffirmed its state action doctrine in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) striking down
the 1875 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited race discrimination in privately owned places of
public accommodation, as beyond Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
22. Id. at 552.
23. Id. at 548.
24. Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
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viewed as protecting the powerful against the powerless.25 Progressives
accused the Court of judicial activism and attacked the institution of judicial
review. They argued that it was inappropriate for unelected federal courts to
strike down measures enacted by democratically elected legislatures.26 Some
progressives called for the abolition of judicial review.27 Others supported
measures to curtail the Court’s power and introduced numerous bills in
Congress which would have limited federal jurisdiction.28 In 1932,
progressive allies of labor succeeded with the passage of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, which prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions in
labor disputes.29 However, other activists sought to use the courts to enforce
individual rights. The National Association of Colored People (NAACP)
formed in 1909 and began a legal campaign to overturn Plessy v.
Ferguson.30 A change in the Court’s approach to rights during the New Deal
Era opened the door for their success.
A.

The Right to Contract and the Progressive Campaign Against Judicial
Activism

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the only individual right that
the Supreme Court of the United States enforced was the “right to contract”
of workers and employers. For example, in Lochner v. New York,31 the Court
struck down a state law limiting the working hours of bakers as violating
their right to contract to work more hours.32 In Coppage v. Kansas,33 the
Court struck down a law prohibiting employers from forcing their
employees to pledge not to join unions as a condition of employment.34 In
Hammer v. Dagenhart,35 the Court struck down a federal law limiting the
use of child labor on federalism grounds.36 These rulings sparked the
25. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937, at 13–14 (1994).
26. Id. at 131. For example, progressives supported the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which
prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor-management disputes and
established a process of expedited review of federal court decisions striking down state laws
as unconstitutional. See ZIETLOW, supra note 9, at 71.
27. ROSS, supra note 25, at 49–56.
28. Id.
29. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2018); see Zietlow, supra note 15, at
71.
30. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 1 (1987).
31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. Id. at 64–65.
33. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
34. Id. at 26.
35. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
36. Id. at 277.
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progressive attacks on the federal courts.37 During the New Deal Era, the
Court further angered progressives, including President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, by striking down popular measures regulating the economy. 38 By
1936, Lochner and its progeny were widely viewed as an inappropriate use
of judicial power, examples of harmful judicial activism intruding upon
progressive reform legislation.39 After he was re-elected in a landslide that
year, President Roosevelt proposed a plan to expand the Court’s
membership so that he could appoint judges who were sympathetic to his
New Deal measure.40 Although Roosevelt’s court-packing plan failed,41 the
Court began to back away from its activist approach to economic
legislation.42
In the late 1930s, the Court abandoned its “right to contract”
jurisprudence. In the 1936 case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,43 the
Court upheld a Washington law establishing a minimum wage over the
objections that it violated the right to contract.44 In the 1937 case of NLRB v.
Jones,45 the Court did not even mention the right to contract when it upheld
the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, a progressive New
Deal measure which established a federal right to organize into unions and
bargain collectively.46 In the 1938 case of United States v. Carolene
Products Co.,47 the Court abandoned its right to contract jurisprudence and
declared a new approach of deference to economic legislation.48 In
subsequent cases, the Court made it clear that it would no longer intervene
in the legislative process to protect the “right to contract.”49 The Court’s turn
37. ROSS, supra note 25, at 167.
38. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act as an invalid use of Congress’s
commerce powers); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, which regulated the hours and wages of coal miners,
as an invalid use of Congress’s commerce powers).
39. See ZIETLOW, supra note 9, at 84; see also RISA GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF
CIVIL RIGHTS 34 (2007).
40. KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY
PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 61 (2004).
41. Id. at 83.
42. Id. at 86.
43. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
44. Id. at 400.
45. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
46. Id. at 49.
47. 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding a federal law barring the sale of “filled milk”).
48. Id. at 153–54.
49. See W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage legislation
for women and casting doubt on the existence of a right to contract). West Coast Hotel Co.
overruled an earlier precedent, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), in which
the Court struck down minimum wage legislation as violating the right to contract. 300 U.S.
379.
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away from the right to contract and its embrace of judicial deference left
open the question of when, if ever, the Court would intervene in the political
process to protect individual rights.50 In a footnote to his majority opinion in
Carolene Products, Justice Harlan F. Stone suggested a new approach to
rights, one in which courts would intervene to protect the rights of
minorities.51
B.

Carolene Products and Judicial Protection of “Discrete and Insular
Minorities”

In Carolene Products, the Court rejected a challenge to a federal law
which prohibited the sale of “filled milk.”52 The challengers argued that the
law violated their right to contract, but the Court disagreed.53 In his majority
opinion, Justice Stone expressed great deference to Congress and indicated a
reluctance to overturn democratically enacted legislation.54 However, Stone
admitted that sometimes the Court’s deference to the political process might
not be warranted. In footnote four, Stone suggested that legislation that
harms “discrete insular minorities,” or that infringes on expressly
enumerated constitutional rights, indicates that the political process is not
working and would not be entitled to the same presumption of
constitutionality that the Court extends to legislation in general.55
The Carolene Products rule of deference reflected the presumption that
the political process usually worked.56 Moreover, courts should defer to
legislatures because they are elected by the people and therefore accountable
to the people in a way that judges are not.57 The Court’s overall approach to
evaluating legislation assumed that the political process generally
functioned well. However, footnote four suggested that legislation
restricting the political process might be subject to “more exacting” judicial
scrutiny.58 Footnote four also acknowledged the fact that prejudice against
“discrete and insular minorities” tends to “curtail the operation of those
political processes” and thus may also be subject to a more searching
inquiry.59 Stone’s footnote thus laid out a persuasive justification for the
Court to act to protect minority rights.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See GOLUBOFF, supra note 39, at 16.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 152 n.4.
See ELY, supra note 13, at 86.
Id.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
Id.

2019]

COOPER SUPREMACY

291

In the late 1930s, African Americans were the textbook example of
“discrete and insular minorities” that the political process had failed
repeatedly. In the North, blacks were a minority of voters, and their political
clout was limited by racial discrimination.60 In the South, blacks were
excluded from voting.61 Despite the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment
expressly prohibits states from denying the franchise on the basis of race,
blacks faced violence, even death, if they even attempted to exercise their
political rights.62 Jim Crow laws and brutal violence in the South, coupled
with the lack of protections from race discrimination in the North, evidenced
that blacks were truly “discrete and insular minorities”63 who needed
protection from the tyranny of the majority. In subsequent years, members
of the Court cautiously embraced its role of enforcing constitutional rights
and protecting the rights of minorities.
In a 1943 case striking down a law that required children who were
Jehovah’s Witnesses to recite the pledge of allegiance in school, Justice
Robert Jackson opined, “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”64 The Court began to protect
the voting rights of African Americans in a series of cases invalidating
racially restrictive election practices.65 In the 1948 case of Shelley v.
Kramer,66 the Court held that a racially restrictive covenant violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 With these
opinions, the Court signaled its willingness to tackle race discrimination.
The most significant of the Court’s early rulings protecting the rights of
minorities was the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education.68 In
Brown, the Court held that state mandated segregation of public education
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 Brown
was the culmination of a decades-long strategy by the NAACP Legal

60. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 291 (2004).

CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT

61. Id.
62. Id. at 374.
63. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
64. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
65. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that a racially exclusionary
primaries held by a private organization that functioned as the Democratic Party violated the
Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that racially
exclusionary primaries violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
66. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
67. Id. at 13–14.
68. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
69. Id. at 495.
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Defense Fund to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.70 In a series of per curiam
rulings following Brown, the Court established that Brown had overruled
Plessy and held that all state mandated segregation violated the Equal
Protection Clause.71
In Shelley, Brown, and cases following Brown, the Court intruded on
the political process and overturned laws supported by the majority. Though
progressives had condemned the Court’s activism during the Lochner era,
many applauded the Court’s ruling in Brown.72 Supporters of civil rights
agreed that protecting discrete and insular minorities justified Court rulings
upholding the civil rights of blacks.73 Fixing the political process justified
the Court’s intervention in the political process in the South, where blacks
had historically been denied the right to vote.74 Repeat losers in the political
process, African Americans needed the Court to intervene on their behalf
and correct that imbalance. Over time, many scholars came to view the
Justices on the Warren Court as counter-majoritarian heroes in the fight for
civil rights.75 The Court asserted that role most strongly in Cooper v.
Aaron.76

70. The NAACP had scored incremental victories, laying the groundwork for Brown, in
a series of cases challenging racially segregated law schools. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that a separate law school for blacks established by the University
of Texas violated the Equal Protection Clause); Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938) (holding as unconstitutional a Missouri law that excluded blacks from its state
law school).
71. See Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (invalidating segregation of courtroom
seating); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (public restaurants); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (municipal bus system); Balt. City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) (public beaches and bathhouses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(public golf courses).
72. Klarman, supra note 14, at 19.
73. Id. at 1 (“It is common wisdom that a fundamental purpose of judicial review is to
protect minority rights from majoritarian over-reaching.”).
74. ELY, supra note 13, at 116.
75. A recent Lexis search uncovered 506 law review articles written in the past twenty
years advocating the proposition that courts should protect minorities against the will of the
majority. For just a few of the many prominent scholars supporting this view, see JUDITH
BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 281 (1983); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW
BIRTH OF FREEDOM 125 (1997); ELY, supra note 13, at 7; KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1989); see also JOHN J. DINAN,
KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF
RIGHTS, at x (1998) (stating that “the nation’s leading law faculty are nearly unanimous” in
believing the judiciary is best suited to protecting liberties). But see Frank B. Cross,
Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529 (2000)
(questioning this assumption).
76. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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III. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND COOPER V. AARON
In Cooper, the Court addressed a direct conflict between state
majorities and the rights of minorities over essential constitutional
valuesthe equal protection of the law.77 The Court’s opinion was signed
by all of the members of the Court, a highly unusual, if not unprecedented,
step.78 The Court’s opinion in Cooper asserted its absolute commitment to
protecting the civil rights of African Americans and proclaimed its
legitimacy when doing so.79
A.

Historical Background

The facts underlying Cooper began in Little Rock, Arkansas, shortly
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.80 The state of Arkansas, like
other Southern states, had required the segregation of public schools.81
Responding to Brown, members of the Little Rock School Board met and
formulated a plan to desegregate the public schools.82 Under the plan of
gradual desegregation adopted by the school board, the process would begin
in the fall of 1957 and be completed by the fall of 1963.83 Desegregation
would begin in the high school and eventually extend to Little Rock’s
elementary schools.84 A group of black school children and their parents
filed a lawsuit challenging the plan and asking for faster action.85 However,
the district court approved the plan,86 and the court of appeals affirmed.87
While the local school board was incalcitrant, Arkansas state officials
went much further in their resistance to the Brown ruling. In November
1956, the Arkansas constitution was amended, “commanding the Arkansas
General Assembly to oppose ‘in every Constitutional manner the Unconstitutional desegregation decisions of [Brown and Brown II].’”88 In
February of 1957, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted a law relieving
school children from compulsory attendance at racially mixed schools89 and

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 16–19.
Id. at 4.
Id. 16–19.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956).
Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957).
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8–9 (quoting ARK. CONST. amend. XLIV (repealed 1990)).
Id. at 9 (citing ARK. STATS. §§ 80-1519 to 80-1524 (1957)).
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adopted a measure establishing a “State Sovereignty Commission.”90 These
laws defied the Brown decision and created a direct conflict between state
and federal law. The conflict exploded on the ground in Little Rock.91
On September 2, 1957, the day before nine black students were
scheduled to attend their first day at Little Rock Central High, Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus dispatched the Arkansas state militia to the school
grounds and block the black students’ access to the school.92 The governor’s
actions sparked increased opposition to the desegregation plan by Little
Rock residents.93 The school board asked the district court to postpone the
desegregation plan, citing the stationing of military guard by state
authorities.94 However, the district court rejected the board’s petition and
ordered it to proceed.95 For three weeks, the Arkansas National Guard
prevented the schoolchildren from entering the school.96 The district court
issued an injunction prohibiting the governor and the National Guard from
preventing the attendance of the black children at Central High School, but
the federal judge could not implement his decision without help from the
United States military.97
On September 25, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower dispatched
federal troops to Central High to protect the black students against the angry
mobs which surrounded the school and to effectuate the federal judge’s
order.98 Federal troops stayed in Little Rock until November 27, escorting
the students to and from school and protecting them while they attended
school.99 On February 20, 1958, the school board petitioned the district court
again, asking the judge to postpone their desegregation program due to the
extreme hostility against the black students.100 School board officials sought
to withdraw the students from Central High and send them to their former
segregated school.101 This time, the judge granted the petition due to the
conditions of “chaos, bedlam and turmoil.”102 The court of appeals reversed
the district court, and the school board appealed that ruling to the Supreme
Court of the United States.103
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. (citing ARK. STATS. §§ 6-801 to 6-824 (1957)).
KLARMAN, supra note 60, at 326–27.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 327; see Cooper, 358 U.S. at 9–10.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
KLARMAN, supra note 60, at 326–27.
Id. at 326.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
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Supreme Court Proceedings

Cooper arrived at the Supreme Court of the United States at the end of
the summer of 1958.104 As school was scheduled to begin in Little Rock on
September 15, the Court placed the case on a fast-track docket and issued its
preliminary ruling immediately after the hearing.105 The case presented a
dramatic challenge to the Court’s legitimacy and to the legitimacy of lower
federal courts tasked with enforcing the Court’s Brown ruling.106 Moreover,
the case involved not only a direct conflict between state and federal law,
but a conflict that state officials had instigated by directly defying the
Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution.107 President
Eisenhower had backed the Court by sending federal troops to Arkansas, but
even after that assertion of federal power, state officials remained defiant.108
In this context, the Court’s signed per curiam decision dramatically asserted
its authority to interpret the Constitution and to protect minority rights.109
According to the Court, the case “raise[d] questions of the highest
importance to the maintenance of our federal system of government,”
including most notably whether state officials were bound by the rulings of
the Supreme Court of the United States.110 The answer, said the Court, was
in the United States Constitution itself, which declares the Constitution the
“supreme law of the land” and requires elected state officials to swear an
oath to uphold it.111 Quoting Marbury v. Madison,112 the Court asserted, “[i]t
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.”113 Thus identifying itself with the Constitution, the Court held
that the logical consequence was that state officials had to adhere to its
rulings. Said the Court, “the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land,”
is binding on state officials as the written Constitution itself.114
In Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall had been more circumspect,
concluding that “a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”115 Marshall thus
left open the possibility that other government officials might share the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
Id.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180.
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responsibility to interpret constitutional meaning.116 However, in Cooper,
the Court resolved any ambiguity. When opinions differed, the Court’s
opinion was supreme, trumping all other government officials.117 The
Court’s assertion of absolute authority made sense in the face of open
defiance by state officials. Moreover, the Court asserted its power in defense
of the rights of those who needed protection from those officials.118 Cooper
was an assertion of raw power nonetheless.
In the Cooper decision, the Court explained that state officials had to
follow the Court’s ruling in Brown, even though they had not been parties to
the case, because “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution.”119 State officials are bound to follow the United
States Constitution, and the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution had
the same authority as the Constitution itself.120 It follows that “the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the
Brown case is the supreme law of the land.”121 The Court concluded,
[T]he principles announced in [Brown v. Board of Education] and the
obedience of the States to them, according to the command of the
Constitution, are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms
guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional
ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth. 122

In this unanimous per curiam opinion, signed by all of the Justices on
the Court, those Justices embraced their roles as “counter-majoritarian
heroes”123 and champions of racial justice.124
IV. EVOLUTION OF COOPER SUPREMACY
In Cooper, the Supreme Court expressed two important themes. First,
the Court claimed a unique relationship with the United States Constitution.
116. See Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 775 (2002).
117. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id. at 18.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 19–20.
123. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism and Constitutionalism Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1933–34 (1995) (referring to the
“myth of the Court as ‘counter-majoritarian hero’”).
124. Klarman questions whether the members of the Court really acted as “countermajoritarian heroes.” Id. Other scholars have followed suit. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004); Zietlow, supra note 15.
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All federal and state officials are required to swear an oath to the
Constitution and must engage in constitutional interpretation as part of their
official duties.125 However, in Cooper, the Court made it clear that of all of
those officials, the Supreme Court of the United States is the supreme
interpreter of the Constitution, and its interpretations trump those of all other
officials.126 Second, the Court made it clear that it would use that position to
protect individual constitutional rights, especially the rights of those who
were vulnerable to the oppression of the majoritarian, elected, political
branches.127 Thus, the Court not only reaffirmed its ruling in Brown but
reaffirmed the federal judiciary’s commitment to protecting minority rights.
After an initial expansion of the Court’s protection of minority rights
post-Cooper, the Court began to retreat from civil rights enforcement and
place new procedural limits upon civil rights cases. More recently, the Court
has adhered only to the first theme of Cooper supremacy—the Court’s
special role interpreting the Constitution, and its supremacy over the states
and coordinate branches when doing so.128 The Court has largely abandoned
the second prong of Cooper supremacy, the Court’s rights protecting role.129
Instead, the Court has restricted the ability of federal courts and Congress to
protect civil rights.130
A.

Expansion and Deference: The Warren Court (1953–1969)

Following Cooper, the Warren Court issued many rulings expanding
the meaning of minority rights under the Equal Protection Clause. For
example, the Court struck down state laws which discriminated on the basis
of race,131 and broadly interpreted voting rights under the Equal Protection
Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment.132 Perhaps the most important Warren
Court rulings were those which opened up the lower federal courts to civil
rights lawsuits and enabled those courts to remedy rights violations by state

125. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
126. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution. . . . [T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land . . . .”).
127. Id. at 19–20 (“The principles announced in [Brown v. Board of Education] and the
obedience of the States to them, according to the command of the Constitution, are
indispensable for the protection of freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of
us.”).
128. See infra Section IV.C.
129. See infra Section IV.C.
130. See infra Section IV.C.
131. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
132. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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officials.133 In addition, and despite its assertion of supreme constitutional
authority in Cooper, the Warren Court generally deferred to the other
federal branches when they also acted to protect minority rights.134 This
deference was undoubtedly due to the fact that federal officials in the 1960s
agreed with the Court’s mission of protecting minority rights against state
infringement.135 Thus, even as the Warren Court relied on Cooper to strike
down state laws discriminating against minorities, it deferred to the
coordinate federal branches as they also sought to advance the cause of civil
rights.
1.

Opening Courts to Civil Rights Claims

The most notable Warren Court decision expanding civil rights
litigation was its 1961 ruling in Monroe v. Pape.136 In Monroe, the plaintiff
sued police officers in the city of Chicago, arguing that the officers had
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when they searched him
and his apartment without probable cause.137 The lawsuit was brought
pursuant to the Reconstruction Era civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which provides a cause of action to enforce constitutional rights against
officials acting under color of state law.138 Though enacted in 1871, the
statute had largely lain dormant until the Court’s opinion in Monroe.139 At
issue was the question of whether police officers who violated state law
were acting under color of law and thus subject to suit under § 1983.140 The
police officers argued for a narrower interpretation of the statutethat it
would only apply to state officials following state law.141 The Court adopted
the broader interpretationa state official was acting under state law, thus
subject to suit under § 1983, whenever he was on duty.142
The Court’s ruling in Monroe had a revolutionary impact on civil rights
litigation. Before Monroe, state officials throughout the country had violated
the federal rights of individuals without much fear of being sued.143 The
Court’s expansive interpretation of § 1983 opened up the federal courts for

133. See infra Section IV.A.1.
134. See infra Section IV.A.2.
135. See infra Section IV.A.2.
136. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
137. Id. at 168.
138. Id. at 171.
139. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 185–86.
143. See William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of Civil
and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REV. 651, 697 (1994).

2019]

COOPER SUPREMACY

299

broad enforcement of federal rights.144 The Warren Court also overturned
previous court rulings and held that almost the entire Bill of Rights was
incorporated, and thus enforceable, against state governments.145
In other cases, the Warren Court articulated a broad test for courts to
imply private rights of action to enforce federal statutes. The issue arises
when Congress creates federal rights without clarifying how they are to be
enforced, and the executive branch promulgates federal regulations
enforcing those statutes. In J. I. Case v. Borak,146 the Court held that
individual plaintiffs could sue to enforce federal statutes whenever such a
suit was necessary to make effective a congressional purpose.147 This wideopen test allowed the Court to use its discretion in determining
congressional purpose, making it relatively easy for individual plaintiffs to
sue to enforce statutes when Congress had not made it clear that it intended
plaintiffs to do so.148
In another series of cases, the Warren Court narrowly interpreted
justiciability doctrines, such as standing and political question doctrines,
which could otherwise have served as barriers to civil rights litigation. For
example, in Flast v. Cohen,149 the Court held that taxpayers had standing to
argue that congressional authorization of the payment of federal funds to
religious schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.150 The Flast opinion created an exception to the longstanding
rule that taxpayers could not sue the government for violating the
Constitution by spending their money.151 Similarly, in Baker v. Carr,152 the
Court allowed a challenge to voting districts under the Equal Protection
Clause, finding that it was not barred by the long-standing rule that similar
reapportionment cases based on the Article IV Guaranty Clause were nonjusticiable political questions.153 Baker set the stage for the Court’s ruling in
Reynolds v. Sims,154 where the Court ruled that districts for United States
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (listing Warren Court cases
incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights).
146. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
147. Id. at 435.
148. The Court later restricted the test for private rights of action. See infra Part IV.B.2.
149. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
150. Id. at 105–06.
151. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). However, the Court later
interpreted the Flast ruling as establishing a very narrow exception to the rule against
taxpayer standing. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 481 (1982) (holding that taxpayers did not have standing to
challenge the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to transfer federal property for
use by religious schools).
152. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
153. Id. at 228–29.
154. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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and state representatives must be apportioned equally.155 In Reynolds, the
Court intervened directly in the Alabama state political process, fully
embracing its mission to make the process fairer and more just for
minorities, as well as other voters.156 Thus, the Warren Court’s flexibility on
justiciability issues furthered its mission to protect minority rights.
In the private right of action and justiciability cases, the Court made it
clear that separation-of-powers limitations would not prevent it from
enforcing individual rights. Thus, many Warren Court rulings following
Cooper reinforced Cooper’s message that the federal courts were open for
business in enforcing civil rights. The Warren Court actively embraced the
first prong of Cooper supremacythe Court’s commitment to protecting
minority rights.
2.

Deference to Other Federal Branches

However, the Warren Court was circumspect about its other Cooper
messagethat of judicial supremacy. Despite the Warren Court’s activist
reputation, the Court set a highly deferential baseline evaluating economic
legislation which did not infringe on minority rights.157 Moreover, the
Warren Court used its Cooper supremacy largely to strike down state laws
that discriminated against minorities but shied away from striking down
federal legislation.158 The Court was especially deferential to Congress and
the executive branch when those federal branches acted to protect minority
rights.159 Even when Congress arguably entered the Court’s realm of
constitutional interpretation, the Court applied a deferential rational basis
review and upheld that legislation.160
Responding to civil rights activists, the 1960s Congress enacted
numerous measures defining and protecting equality rights. For example,
Congress outlawed race discrimination by privately owned places of public
accommodation with the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.161 Prior to
the Act, members of the Court disagreed about whether it was a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause when private businesses called on the police to
arrest blacks for trespass, enforcing private segregation.162 In 1883, the
Court ruled that Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
155. Id. at 535.
156. Id.
157. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Zietlow, supra note 15, at 276.
158. See Zietlow, supra note 15, at 274–75.
159. See infra notes 161–197 and accompanying text.
160. See Id.
161. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. (2018)).
162. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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did not reach private discrimination,163 and some members of the Court were
reluctant to overturn that precedent.164 Congress sidestepped that issue by
relying on the Commerce Clause as well as the Equal Protection Clause as
sources of its power to outlaw private race discrimination.165 In Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,166 the Court upheld the Act as a valid
Commerce Clause measure.167 The Court applied a deferential rational basis
review to uphold the statute protecting minority rights.168 The Court’s
majority opinion sidestepped the Equal Protection issue and addressed only
the Commerce Clause question, thereby avoiding a potentially awkward
confrontation with Congress over constitutional meaning.169
The Court was even more deferential to Congress in evaluating the
constitutionality of another landmark civil rights measure, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (VRA).170 The VRA outlawed the states’ use of discriminatory
barriers to voting, including literacy tests.171 Many Southern states had
required voters to take a literacy test as a condition of voting and
discriminated against blacks when administering those tests.172 In the 1959
case of Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections,173 the Court
had held that literacy tests did not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless
plaintiffs could prove that state officials intentionally discriminated when
administering the tests.174 However, with Section 4(b) of the 1965 Act,
Congress prohibited the use of literacy tests in all congressional districts
which had a disproportionately low level of minority voters.175

163. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
164. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5–6 (2003).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018).
166. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 258 (“The only questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for
finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis,
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate.”).
169. See id. at 252 (concluding that the Civil Rights Cases was not relevant to the case at
hand because Congress relied on its commerce power to enact the 1964 Act). In his
concurrence to the opinion, Justice Douglas criticized his peers for failing to address the issue
and to overturn the Civil Rights Cases, and he argued that the Act should be upheld as an
exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 280 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
170. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10314
(2018)).
171. 52 U.S.C. § 10303.
172. See KLARMAN, supra note 60, at 31.
173. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
174. Id. at 53.
175. Section 4(b) prohibited the use of literacy tests in districts where the Attorney
General determines that fewer than fifty percent of its residents are registered to vote and
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Notwithstanding the Court’s ruling in Lassiter, Section 4(b) did not require
plaintiffs to prove that local officials had intentionally discriminated against
minority voters.176 Congress expressly relied on its power to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause when enacting the VRA.177 Thus, the Court was forced to confront
the issue of whether Congress could interpret the Amendment more
expansively than the Court did.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,178 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 4(b).179 South Carolina argued that the law
intruded on the Court’s power to interpret the Constitution because it
prohibited practices that no court had found to be unconstitutional.180 In his
majority opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren rejected the argument that only
the Court could determine the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.181 To
the contrary, the framers of the Amendment had intended Congress to be
“chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in Section One.”182
Citing McCulloch v. Maryland,183 the Court held that the only role for the
Court was to determine whether the legislation was a rational means to
effectuate the Equal Protection Clause.184 The Court deferred to
congressional findings that literacy tests had in all likelihood been used with
a discriminatory purpose in the states most affected by the statute and held
that Section 4(b) was a rational means to address state officials’
discriminatory use of literacy tests.185
Katzenbach was a relatively easy case because it involved the type of
discrimination which Congress had found to be widespread in Southern
states.186 Even in Lassiter, the Court agreed that if such discrimination
existed, it would violate the Equal Protection Clause.187 Arguably, Congress
had not usurped the Court’s role of articulating constitutional meaning, but
authorized the appointment of federal electoral examiners in those districts. 52 U.S.C. §
10303(b).
176. Id.
177. Id. § 10302.
178. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
179. Id. at 308.
180. No court had found South Carolina to have used literacy tests to intentionally
discriminate which would have violated the Court’s ruling in Lassiter. See id. at 314–15.
181. Id. at 326.
182. Id.
183. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
184. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.” (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 309.
187. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Election, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959).
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only augmented it. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,188 however, the Court
evaluated a measure which went well beyond any court rulings.189 At issue
in Morgan was Section 4(e) of the VRA, which provided that no person who
has successfully completed the sixth grade in a public school accredited by
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was
other than English could be denied the right to vote on account of his or her
failure to read English.190 Section 4(e) remedied discrimination which had
never been identified by any court, because no court had ever held that New
York state officials had used the literacy tests to discriminate on the basis of
race.191 Hence, the case directly raised the question of whether Congress had
the autonomous authority to identify violations of the Equal Protection
Clause, arguably challenging the Court’s role to do so.192
In his majority opinion, Justice William Brennan rejected the state’s
argument that the statute exceeded Congress’s power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment under Section Five of that Amendment. The Court
stated, “[a] construction of Section Five that would require a judicial
determination that the enforcement of a state law precluded by Congress
violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional
enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and
congressional responsibility for implementing the amendment.”193 As in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court cited McCulloch, holding that
Section Five was intended to give Congress the “same broad powers
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”194 The Court’s only role was
to determine whether Congress was rational when it identified
discrimination and enacted a law to remedy that discrimination. “It is not for
us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that
we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve this
conflict as it did.”195 Thus, in Morgan, the Court appeared to defer to
congressional judgment about the meaning of the Constitution.
The other branches of the federal government responded to the Court
with mutual support. In the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress included
provisions prohibiting recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the
basis of race and empowering the Attorney General to bring suits to enforce
188. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
189. Id.
190. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(e), 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e) (2018). The provision was
sponsored by New York Senators Jacob Javits and Robert Kennedy, and it was intended to
supersede a New York state law which required the ability to read and write in English as a
condition of voting. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 645 n.3.
191. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 648–49.
194. Id. at 650–51 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
195. Id. at 653.
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the Act.196 In a speech in support of the Civil Rights Act, Senator Hubert
Humphrey explained that Congress intended those measures to enable
further enforcement of the Brown ruling.197 Thus, both federal branches
acted with respectful deference to advance the cause of civil rights and
avoided potentially awkward conflicts over the scope of each branch’s
authority.
During the Warren Court years, Presidents John F. Kennedy and
Lyndon B. Johnson largely supported the Court’s effort to enforce minority
rights. Though initially reluctant, like President Eisenhower, President
Kennedy sent federal troops to guard black students attempting to attend
public universities in Mississippi and Alabama over state and local
resistance.198 President Johnson helped to lead the successful fight for the
1964 Civil Rights and 1965 Voting Rights Acts,199 and after they were
enacted his administration actively enforced their provisions.200
Nonetheless, liberals viewed the federal courts as “counter-majoritarian
heroes” and celebrated the judicial supremacy of Cooper as a necessary
means to a crucially important end.201 This viewpoint was bolstered by state
officials’ continued resistance to federal court oversight, from Alabama
Governor George Wallace’s declaration of “segregation now, segregation
tomorrow, segregation forever” on the steps of the state capitol to state
courts adoption of novel interpretations of state procedural laws to evade
Supreme Court review of their interpretations of federal law.202 I was taught
this model when I was a student at Yale Law School in the late 1980s. Many
of my professors reminisced about where they were and what they were
doing, when the Court decided Brown. It is only a slight exaggeration to say
that my professors viewed the Justices in Cooper as white knights fending
off the unruly racist mobs who would resist federal courts’ civil rights

196. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (2018).
197. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 197 (1985); see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure
These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 972
(2005).
198. KLARMAN, supra note 60, at 432–33.
199. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 197, at 83, 96, 125–26, 173–77; ZIETLOW, supra
note 9, at 107; Klarman, supra note 14, at 436, 440–41.
200. ARCHIBOLD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 139 (1968); ZIETLOW, supra note 9, at 157.
201. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that a
novel state rule that petitions for review in the Alabama Supreme Court could only be
brought by certiorari rather than mandamus was not an adequate state ground barring
Supreme Court review of the state court’s ruling that the NAACP had no First Amendment
right to refuse to share its membership list with Alabama state officials).
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enforcement. Many scholars have expressed similar views.203 Thus, liberals
lauded both prongs of the Cooper rulingjudicial supremacy and support
for minority rightsas essential to the expansion of civil rights.
B.

Reaction and Retrenchment: The Burger (1969–1986) and Rehnquist
(1986–2005) Courts

Though liberals lauded the Warren Court, conservatives harshly
criticized the Court and accused it of judicial activism.204 In 1968, Richard
Nixon ran for president with a “tough on crime” platform and attacked the
Warren Court’s rulings that enforced the rights of criminal defendants.205
Chief Justice Warren resigned in 1968, and when Nixon was elected, he
appointed conservative Warren E. Burger to replace him. 206 President Nixon
also made another key appointment to the Supreme CourtJustice William
Rehnquist.207 Under Chief Justice Burger, and due largely to Rehnquist’s
influence, the Court backed away from the active civil rights enforcement of
the Warren Court.208 The Burger Court continued to use Cooper supremacy
over the other federal branches, but no longer to protect minority rights.209
Warren Burger retired as Chief Justice in 1986.210 To replace him,
President Ronald Reagan elevated the chief architect of the Court’s
retrenchment on civil rights, Justice Rehnquist, to be Chief Justice.211
Reagan then appointed an outspoken conservative, Antonin Scalia, to take
Rehnquist’s place as Associate Justice.212 Under Rehnquist’s leadership, and
with Scalia as the most outspoken champion, the Court engaged in a full203. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1118 (1991); Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to the Virtual Bill of
Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 618 (2002); David Luban, The Warren Court and
the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 7 (1999); see also Klarman, supra note
14, at 19 (pointing out that many scholars view members of the Warren Court as “countermajoritarian heroes”).
204. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 12, at 16–23; LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 73–74 (1958); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme
Court 1963 Term, Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1963).
205. Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on
Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 14–15 (2013).
206. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1071–72.
207. Id.
208. See infra Section IV.B.1.
209. See infra Section IV.C.
210. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 206, at 1051.
211. Id. at 1052.
212. Id.

306

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

scale retrenchment from the role of protector of the rights of minorities.213
The Rehnquist Court revitalized principles of state sovereignty that the
Warren Court had downplayed.214 The Rehnquist Court also adopted a race
blind approach to race discrimination cases and struck down race-based
affirmative action measures.215 Ironically, in the Court’s affirmative action
cases, the Court has imposed barriers to majoritarian political branches
adopting remedial measures to advance minority rights.216
1.

Retreating from Civil Rights Enforcement

The Burger Court had a mixed record on civil rights. In its
desegregation decisions, the Burger Court authorized the supervision of
local school boards by district courts and approved bussing and other
affirmative measures to remedy race discrimination in public schools.217 The
Burger Court also ruled in favor of plaintiffs in a series of cases asserting
sex equality rights under the Equal Protection Clause.218 In addition, the
third Nixon appointee, Justice Harry Blackmun, wrote the opinion in Roe v.
Wade,219 establishing a constitutional right for a woman to choose to have an
abortion.220 All of these cases were consistent with the Warren Court’s
rulings protecting minority rights.
On the other hand, the Burger Court also began a retrenchment in civil
rights cases. In Milliken v. Bradley,221 the Court struck down a Michigan
district court’s order mandating a multi-district remedy for the segregation
of public schools in Detroit, Michigan.222 The Court’s ruling in Milliken
greatly limited the power of federal courts to remedy segregation in the face
of white flight to the suburbs.223 Lower federal courts continued to exercise
oversight over local school districts and to implement desegregation plans
through the 1980s, but the Rehnquist Court restricted the scope of the
213. Id. at 1067 (“William Rehnquist has for thirty years now proved to be a patient but
persistent defender of the constitutional values of the right wing of the Republican Party.”).
214. See infra Section IV.B.1.
215. See infra Section IV.B.2.
216. See infra Section IV.B.1.
217. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
218. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
219. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
220. Id. at 154.
221. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
222. Id. at 752–53.
223. See Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation: Acknowledging that
Race Discrimination in Public Education Is More than Just a Tort, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 99,
117 (2001); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)
(rejecting the claim that education is a fundamental right).
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courts’ remedial power. In the 1991 case of Board of Education v. Dowell,224
the Rehnquist Court ruled that district courts could cease supervision of
local school districts once they had achieved a “unitary” status of nonsegregation.225 In the 1995 case of Missouri v. Jenkins,226 the Court clarified
that once a local school district had complied with a court’s desegregation
order, the district court was required to dismiss the case.227 These rulings
ended the federal courts’ decades-long attempts to enforce Brown,
decimating the civil rights legacy of Cooper.228
In addition, the Court issued key rulings making it more difficult for
minority plaintiffs to win race discrimination cases. In Washington v.
Davis,229 the Burger Court held that in order for plaintiffs to bring a cause of
action for race discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, they had to
prove that the state had purposely discriminated against them on the basis of
race.230 The Davis ruling makes it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prevail
in race discrimination cases, especially in Northern states lacking a record of
de jure discrimination.231 In McCleskey v. Kemp,232 a challenge to the State
of Georgia’s use of the death penalty, the Court held that statistical evidence
alone is insufficient to prove that the government discriminated on the basis
of race.233 The Court ruled against McCleskey even though it acknowledged
the history of race discrimination within the Georgia criminal justice
system.234 In order to prevail, McCleskey needed to show that government
officials had intentionally discriminated against him as an individual, or that
the state had adopted the death penalty because of, not merely in spite of,
the racially discriminatory impact of the death penalty system.235 The
Court’s ruling in Davis and McCleskey signaled a significant retrenchment
from the Court’s commitment to minority rights.
In another series of rulings, the Court struck down measures intended
to benefit minorities. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,236
224. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
225. Id. at 249–50.
226. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
227. Id. at 101.
228. Under Chief Justice Roberts, the Court further restricted the authority of local school
officials to combat segregation in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). See discussion in infra Section IV.C.1.
229. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
230. Id. at 239.
231. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
232. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
233. Id. at 292.
234. Id. at 292–93.
235. Id. at 298.
236. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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the Court held that a white man could bring a race discrimination challenge
to the university’s affirmative action plan.237 In cases following Bakke, the
Court debated whether to apply a lower level of scrutiny to affirmative
action measures intended to benefit minorities than the strict scrutiny that it
applies to laws discriminating against minorities.238 In Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,239 the Court held that strict scrutiny would apply
to all race-based classifications.240 In his concurrence to Adarand, Justice
Clarence Thomas argued that all race-based classifications violate the Equal
Protection Clause, regardless of how well-intentioned they might be. Said
Justice Thomas, “In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination
based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by
malicious prejudice.”241 Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens ridiculed the
Court’s equivalency, accusing the Court of disregarding the difference
between a “No Trespassing Sign” and a welcome mat.242 Reflecting the
continuing division on the Court, the Court issued divided rulings on the
University of Michigan’s two affirmative action programs, upholding the
law school program but striking down the undergraduate admissions
program.243 Disputes over race-based affirmative action programs continued
into the Roberts Court.244 While the Court’s rulings on discriminatory intent
make it difficult for minority plaintiffs to win civil rights cases, the Court’s
rulings on affirmative action programs, however, have turned the Court’s
commitment to minority rights on its head.

237. Id. at 299.
238. See, e.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny
and upholding an FCC policy that gave a preference to minority-owned businesses in
broadcast licensing). But see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (containing a
divided opinion with a three-Justice concurrence applying intermediate scrutiny, upholding a
federal contracting program in which ten percent of contracts were reserved for minority
businesses); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to strike down a local minority set-aside program which was virtually identical to
federal program upheld in Fullilove).
239. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
240. Id. at 226; see also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (holding that strict
scrutiny should apply to race-based assignment of prisoners, notwithstanding the Court’s
long-held deference to decisions of prison officials).
241. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 245.
243. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down the undergraduate
admissions program because race was a decisive factor in the decision-making process);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the law school admissions program
because race was not the decisive factor).
244. See infra Section IV.C.1.
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Procedural Limits on Civil Rights Litigation

At the same time that the Court has retreated from its commitment to
the substantive rights of minorities, it has also imposed numerous procedural
barriers to civil rights plaintiffs. The Warren Court had thrown the door
open to the federal courts, welcoming challenges to discriminatory state
action. Since then, the Court has slowly closed the door, with rulings
limiting private rights of action, enforcing justiciability limits and sovereign
immunity, and adopting standards for official immunity which make it
virtually impossible for civil rights plaintiffs to prevail.
As with the substantive cases, the Burger Court had a mixed record on
procedural issues. In the notable case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,245 the Court found an implied
private right of action to enforce the Fourth Amendment against federal
officials.246 The Court had identified a similar right of action in 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against state officials in Monroe v. Pape.247 However, § 1983 does not
extend to federal officials.248 Nevertheless, in an opinion written by Justice
William Brennan, the Court held that federal courts had inherent power to
enforce constitutional rights.249 Although Justice Brennan identified some
exceptional circumstances in which the federal courts would lack such
power,250 his Bivens opinion articulated a blanket rule generally authorizing
suits against federal officials.251
The Court applied the Bivens rule to authorize sex discrimination cases
under the Equal Protection Clause against members of Congress252 and to
enforce the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.253 However, the Court soon backed away from Bivens, finding
other causes of action to fall within the exceptions identified by Justice
Brennan in Bivens,254 claims involving sensitive contexts and those in which

245. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
246. Id. at 397.
247. 365 U.S. 167, 191–92 (1961).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
249. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
250. Id. at 396–97.
251. Id. at 389. In his concurrence, Justice John Harlan argued that the Court’s ruling was
consistent with its broad approach to private rights of action to enforce statutes in J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring). See
discussion supra Section IV.A.1.
252. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). Members of Congress had exempted
themselves from suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits sex
discrimination in employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2018).
253. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980).
254. 403 U.S. at 396–97,
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Congress has authorized a different remedy.255 In Schweiker v. Chilicky, the
Court established a presumption against a Bivens remedy whenever
Congress has enacted legislation creating any kind of remedy.256 The
Schweiker presumption effectively precludes the Court from identifying any
new cause of action to enforce constitutional rights against federal officials,
undermining Bivens.
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts also restricted private rights of action
to enforce federal statutes. In Cort v. Ash,257 the Court articulated a four-part
test to determine whether Congress intended to authorize a private right of
action, and congressional purpose was only one element of the test.258 In
Alexander v. Sandoval,259 the Rehnquist Court held that a private right of
action would only be authorized if the text of the statute made it clear that
Congress intended it to do so.260 At issue in Sandoval was the enforceability
of a federal regulation implementing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which prohibits race discrimination by recipients of federal funds.261 The
Court invalidated a regulation which authorized suits to challenge
government practices that had a discriminatory impact without requiring
plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent.262 The Sandoval test, which requires
statutory language authorizing a private right of action, effectively
undermines the concept of implied private rights of action.263 Sandoval thus
reduced the authority of federal courts to enforce federal statutes and had a
devastating impact on civil rights litigation.264
Along with limiting access to federal courts by civil rights plaintiffs,
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts erected new barriers to those claims. Those
Courts vigorously enforced the justiciability limits on federal litigation,
reversing the Warren Court’s trend towards loosening those requirements.
For example, in Allen v. Wright,265 the Court held that black school children
lacked standing to sue the Internal Revenue Service for its failure to enforce
255. E.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (examining a due process claim of
Social Security recipient whose benefits were wrongfully terminated); Bush v. Lucas, 462
U.S. 367 (1983) (examining a First Amendment claim by federal civil service employee);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (examining a race discrimination claim by enlisted
men against a Naval officer).
256. 487 U.S. at 429.
257. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
258. Id. at 80–84.
259. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
260. Id. at 292–93.
261. Id. at 278.
262. Id. at 289.
263. See Pamela Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
183, 195.
264. Id.
265. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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laws denying tax-exempt status to private schools that discriminated on the
basis of race.266 Racially discriminatory private schools facilitated white
flight out of desegregated public schools, undermining the desegregation
effort and denying the school-children plaintiffs the access to a desegregated
education to which they were entitled under Brown.267 However, the Court
held that the plaintiffs had not established the causation required for them to
have standing to bring the suit.268 In other cases, the Court imposed barriers
to Congress establishing standing by authorizing citizen suits,269 and made it
virtually impossible for plaintiffs to seek injunction relief against abusive
police practices.270 Finally, the Court developed a broad doctrine of official
immunity which bars recovery by a significant number of civil rights
plaintiffs.271
Suits brought by private individuals are crucial to the adequate
enforcement of federal law.272 Private enforcement is especially critical to
civil rights enforcement.273 Due to the sheer volume of civil rights
violations, even the most avid Department of Justice (DOJ) is unable to
meet even a fraction of the need for lawsuits enforcing those rights.274
Depending on who the President selects as Attorney General, the DOJ might
not bring any civil rights suits at all.275 Court rulings restricting private rights
of action and imposing enhanced justiciability barriers thus severely
undermine the enforcement of civil rights, betraying the promise of
Cooper.276
However, perhaps the most consequential Supreme Court rulings
restricting civil rights litigation were those enforcing sovereign and official
immunity. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from
exercising their diversity jurisdiction over states as defendants.277 Since the
266. Id. at 740.
267. See id.; Morgan, supra note 222, at 122–23.
268. Recently, the Roberts Court applied a similarly stringent test for causation in
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398, 422 (2013), dismissing a case brought
by human rights attorneys who were likely targets of federal intelligence surveillance.
269. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
270. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
271. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194 (2004).
272. See Karlan, supra note 263, at 186.
273. See Newman v. Piggie Park Ents., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam) (discussing the
importance of the private attorney general).
274. Rob Arthur, Exclusive: Trump’s Justice Department Is Investigating 60% Fewer
Civil
Rights
Cases
than
Obama’s,
VICE
NEWS
(Mar.
6,
2019),
https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/bjq37m/exclusive-trumps-justice-department-isinvestigating-60-fewer-civil-rights-cases-than-obamas.
275. Id.
276. See Karlan, supra note 263, at 186.
277. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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late nineteenth century case of Hans v. Louisiana,278 the Court has read the
Eleventh Amendment more broadly, as prohibiting all suits for damages
against states.279 However, the Court established a huge exception to
sovereign immunity in the 1908 case of Ex parte Young,280 holding that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for injunctive relief against state
officials.281 In cases such as Brown and Cooper, the Warren Court relied in
part on Ex parte Young and simply glossed over sovereign immunity
issues.282 In the 1970s, however, members of the Court began to express
concern that civil rights lawsuits were intruding on state sovereignty. Both
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts relied on sovereign immunity to restrict the
scope of civil rights suits against state governments.
In the 1974 case of Edelman v. Jordan,283 the Court held that sovereign
immunity barred courts from awarding retroactive relief, such as the
payment of welfare benefits wrongly denied to plaintiffs.284 In Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman,285 the Court held that sovereign
immunity barred federal courts from awarding injunctive relief based on
state law.286 Edelman and Pennhurst significantly restricted the remedies
available to plaintiffs suing state governments, including civil rights cases.
Moreover, the Rehnquist Court expanded the doctrine of sovereign
immunity well beyond anything the Court had ever recognized before. Until
1996, Congress had broad power to make federal rights enforceable against
state governments by abrogating sovereign immunity.287 In Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida,288 the Court struck down a provision of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act which authorized Indian tribes to sue states in
disputes over gambling on tribal lands.289 The Court held that Congress
could not use its power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate sovereign
immunity.290 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated a
broad view of state sovereignty, stating that “the background principle of
278. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages
arising from federal law against state governments).
279. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment bars Congress from using its Section One power to abrogate the
sovereign immunity of states).
280. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
281. Id. at 151–52.
282. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
283. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
284. Id. at 662–63.
285. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
286. Id. at 113.
287. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 18 (1989) (Commerce Clause);
Fitzpatrick v. Bizer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power).
288. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1).
289. Id. at 47.
290. Id. at 72.
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state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so
ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area . . . under
the exclusive control of the federal government.”291 State sovereignty
trumped the federal rights at issue in the case, and Congress could not do
anything about it. In a series of cases following Seminole Tribe, the Court
struck down provisions of several civil rights statutes authorizing suits
against state governments.292 In these remarkable rulings, the Court no
longer relied on judicial supremacy to protect civil rights. Instead, the Court
relied on judicial supremacy to limit Congress’s power to define and protect
federal rights.
In addition, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts established a broad rule
on official immunity which poses a significant barrier to civil rights
litigation. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,293 the Court held that officials could not be
sued for some discretionary acts because they had immunity from such
suits.294 In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that officials are immune
from suit if they reasonably relied on clearly established legal rules when
making the decisions that were the subject of the suit.295 Moreover, official
immunity applies unless a plaintiff can show with particularity that the
official’s action was clearly unreasonable and violated clearly established
law.296 The Court’s qualified immunity doctrine imposes a significant barrier
to plaintiffs prevailing in civil rights actions, greatly limiting the authority of
federal courts to remedy civil rights violations.297
C.

Superior and Skeptical: Cooper Supremacy and the Roberts Court
(2005 to present)

The second prong of Cooper supremacy is the view that the Supreme
Court has a special relationship with the Constitution that makes its
constitutional interpretation superior to that of state officials. While the
Warren Court was reluctant to invoke judicial supremacy against the other
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001)
(Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). But see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 724–25 (2003) (upholding a provision of the Family Medical Leave Act authorizing
suits against state governments).
293. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
294. Id. at 247–48.
295. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589 (1998); Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987).
296. See Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730
(2002).
297. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV.
207, 269 (2013).
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federal branches, the current Supreme Court is not so reluctant.
Unfortunately, rather than invoking judicial supremacy to protect civil
rights, the Court now invokes it to restrict the ability of the political
branches to do so. In its affirmative action cases, this Court has overturned
political measures intended to remedy past discrimination against discrete
and insular minorities.298 In cases restricting Congress’s power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has struck down federal legislation
protecting minorities and made it more difficult for Congress to enact
further legislation.299 These cases prevent the political branches from using
the law to remedy the historical impact of prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities.
1.

Curtailing Affirmative Action

Under the current leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts, the
Supreme Court has subjected all measures intended to benefit minorities to
the most stringent strict scrutiny and to the highest level of skepticism. 300
Perhaps the most significant such case was Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,301 in which the Court struck down
policies of local school boards that took race into account to prevent the
segregation of public schools.302 In an opinion written by Chief Justice
Roberts, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the plans.303 The Court rejected
the arguments of the local school boards of Seattle, Washington and
Louisville, Kentucky, that the plans could be justified as a means to prevent
segregation in the schools.304 Chief Justice Roberts ended the opinion with
the observation that “[b]efore Brown, schoolchildren were told where they
could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.”305 Roberts
equated the segregationist laws of the Jim Crow South with the Seattle and
Louisville school officials who hoped to combat segregation, concluding,
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.”306
The Court’s decision in Parents Involved turned the principles of
Brown and Cooper on their heads. As Justice Stevens observed in his
298. See infra Section IV.C.1.
299. See infra Section IV.C.2.
300. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (applying
strict scrutiny and expressing skepticism of affirmative action in college admissions).
301. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
302. See id. at 709–11.
303. Id. at 720.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 747.
306. Id. at 748.
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dissent, “There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reliance on [Brown]. . .
. The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who
were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white
children struggling to attend black schools.”307 In Brown and Cooper, the
Court’s intervention in democratically elected state and local governments
was justified by the fact that the Court was protecting minorities against the
tyranny of the majority.308 In Parents Involved, however, the majority had
elected to act to protect minorities, and the Court used its power to stop
them.
2.

Restricting Congressional Power to Protect Civil Rights

The Warren Court generally treated the other federal branches with
deference. Most problematically, however, the current Court has relied on
judicial supremacy to prevent the other federal branches from acting. The
Court’s skepticism about congressional power to protect civil rights dates
back to the Rehnquist Court’s ruling in the case of City of Boerne v.
Flores.309 In Boerne, the Court struck down a provision of the 1993
Religious Freedom Restoration Act which authorized suits against state
governments.310 Congress had relied on its Section 5 power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact that provision.311 In Katzenbach v.
Morgan,312 the Warren Court had applied a deferential rational basis test to
evaluate Congress’s use of its Section 5 power.313 In Boerne, however, the
Rehnquist Court articulated a new test, a restrictive “congruence and
proportionality” test to limit congressional attempts to remedy
discrimination by enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.314 Anything else
would intrude on the Court’s power to articulate constitutional meaning. As
in Cooper, the Court cited Marbury v. Madison, saying that “[t]he judicial
authority to determine the constitutionality of laws . . . is based on the
premise that the ‘powers of the legislature are defined and limited. . . .’”315
In Morgan, the Court expressed a willingness to defer to Congress
when it upheld a provision of the VRA that was arguably inconsistent with
the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.316 However, in
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 516–17.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
Id. at 656.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
Id. at 516 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)).
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648–49.
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Boerne, the Court said, “If Congress could define its own powers by altering
the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be
‘superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.’”317 While not
expressly overruling Morgan, the Court in Boerne imposed the strictest test
to evaluate Congress’s power to define and protect civil rights. In cases
applying the congruence and proportionality test, the Court made it clear
that Congress is prohibited from creating broader rights than those
established by the Court.318
Following Boerne, the Roberts Court issued one of the Court’s most
regressive rulings in years relating to minority rights since the Brown era,
Shelby County v. Holder.319 In Shelby County, the Court struck down a key
provision of the VRA. At issue was Section 5 of the Act, which required
electoral districts that had a history of discriminating against minorities to
obtain federal preclearance before adopting voting regulations which might
limit the voting rights of minorities.320 The Court held that Section 5 was no
longer justified because it was based on past history, not current reality.321
Almost immediately after the Court issued its ruling, the North Carolina and
Texas legislatures enacted voter identification legislation that had previously
failed the preclearance process.322 Instead of improving the political process
that had repeatedly failed minorities, the Court’s opinion in Shelby County
created barriers to congressional attempts to fix that process. In Shelby
County, the Roberts Court used Cooper supremacy to limit the power of
majorities to enact legislation protecting minorities. In the hands of the
Roberts Court, Cooper supremacy poses a threat, not a promise, to
minorities seeking political empowerment and racial justice.
3.

Politicizing the Court

When the Warren Court decided the cases of Brown and Cooper, many
Southern politicians, and some scholars, accused the Court of engaging in
inappropriate political activism.323 In 1968, Richard Nixon capitalized on the
criticism of Warren Court rulings in his successful campaign for the
presidency, and he appointed judges who retreated from the Warren Court’s
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
570 U.S. 529 (2013).
Id. at 535.
Id. at 547 (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”).
See Vann R. Newkirk II, How Shelby County v. Holder Broke America, THE
ATLANTIC (July 10, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/how-shelbycounty-broke-america/564707/; see also Vann R. Newkirk II, The Battle for North Carolina,
THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/thebattle-for-north-carolina/501257/.
323. See KLARMAN, supra note 60, at 320.
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“judicial activism.”324 Over time, however, Brown and Cooper have gained
supporters. Brown is now widely revered as one of the high marks in the
history of the Court.325 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a successful nominee
to the Supreme Court who does not embrace the Court’s ruling in Brown.
However, since Brown and Cooper, it is undeniable that judicial
nominations, especially those to the Supreme Court of the United States,
have been increasingly politicized.
The 2000 case of Bush v. Gore326 was a landmark case in the
politicization of the Court. In that case, the Court decided the 2000 election
on a partisan vote, electing the candidate who won a minority of the popular
vote.327 The Court ignored the provision of the Constitution that authorized
the House of Representatives to decide such elections.328 The outcome
would likely have been the same, since Republicans held the House at the
time, but the Court’s decision politicized the Court and damaged its
legitimacy.329
More recently, the Court has increased in its continued pattern of
politicization. When Justice Scalia died in the last year of Barack Obama’s
presidency, the Republican Senate refused to consider the President’s
nominee Merrick Garland.330 Despite the fact that Judge Garland was
eminently qualified, the Senate left the seat open for over a year.331 When
President Donald J. Trump was elected, the Senate dropped the filibuster for
Supreme Court nominees, and for the first time a Supreme Court Justice,
Neil Gorsuch, was confirmed on a narrow party-line vote.332 In 2018, after
Justice Kennedy retired from the Court, the Senate rushed through a
controversial nominee, Brett Kavanaugh, without a chance to thoroughly vet
him.333 Like Gorsuch, Kavanaugh was confirmed on a narrow party-line
vote.334 Today, the Supreme Court is widely viewed as a political court
324. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 206, at 1085.
325. See Klarman, supra note 14, at 19 (citing scholars who argue that Brown proves that
courts are “counter-majorotarian heroes”).
326. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 153–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
329. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 206, at 1053.
330. See Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It Matters
Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/whathappened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now.
331. Id.
332. See Seung Min Kim, Burgess Everett & Elana Schor, Senate GOP Goes “Nuclear”
on Supreme Court Filibuster, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2017, 3:01 PM), https://www.politico.
com/story/2017/04/senate-neil-gorsuch-nuclear-option-236937.
333. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn in After Close Confirmation Vote in
Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brettkavanaugh-supreme-court.html.
334. Id.
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without limits on its power.335 Sadly, the politicization of the Court may be
an unintended consequence of Cooper supremacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Footnote four in Carolene Products justified Court intervention in the
political process to protect the rights of minorities. The rationale behind
footnote four suggests that when minorities win in the political process, their
victories are entitled to deference. These two principles define Cooper
supremacy and guided the Warren Court. Over the years, however, judicial
supremacy has evolved, threatening the attempts of elected officials to
defend and protect minority rights. Notwithstanding the good faith of the
Court that decided Cooper v. Aaron, the judicial supremacy that it
established is a troubled legacy at best, and at worst, a dangerous legacy for
the cause of racial justice in this country.

335. See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is the Supreme Court Facing a
Legitimacy Crisis?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.
com/features/is-the-supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis/.

